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 Political Secularism: Why It Is Needed and Why We 
Need to Learn from Its Distinctive Indian Version 
Rajeev Bhargava 
Secularism is a beleaguered doctrine. The predicted decline of religion or its privati-
zation has failed to occur, in non-western and western societies alike. (Casanova 
1994) And political secularism, the doctrine of the separation of state and religion, 
felt a seismic tremor with the establishment of the first modern theocracy in Iran. 
Soon other religious voices began aggressively to occupy the public domain. In 
Egypt, people were exhorted to free themselves of the last vestiges of a colonial 
past and to establish a Muslim state. In 1989, an Islamic state was established in 
Sudan. In 1991, the Islamic Salvation Front won the election in Algeria. Islamic 
movements emerged in Tunisia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Chad, Senegal, Turkey, and in 
Afghanistan. (Westerlund 1996; Keppels 1994) The states of Pakistan and Bangla-
desh increasingly acquired theocratic and Islamicist overtones (Ahmed 1987; Moh-
sin 1999). 
Movements that challenged the seemingly undisputed reign of secularism were 
not restricted to Muslim societies. Singhalese Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka, 
Hindu nationalists in India, religious ultra-orthodoxy in Israel and Sikh nationalists 
demanding a separate state partly on the ground that Sikhism does not recognize 
the separation of religion and state all signaled a deep challenge to secularism (Juer-
gensmeyer 1994). Strong anti-Muslim and anti-Catholic movements of Protestants 
decrying secularism emerged in Kenya, Guatemala and Philippines. Religiously 
grounded political movements arose in Poland, and Protestant fundamentalism 
became a force in American politics. In Western Europe where religion is a per-
sonal response to divinity and still largely private change has come from migrant 
workers of former colonies and intensified globalization. This has thrown together a 
privatized Christianity with Islam, Sikhism, and pre-Christian, South Asian religions 
that do not draw a boundary between the private and the public in the same way. 
These strange bedfellows have created a deep religious diversity, the likes of which 
have never before been known in the West (Turner 2001: 134) As the public spaces 
of western societies are claimed by these other religions, the weak public monopoly 
of single religions is challenged by the very norms that govern these societies. This 
is evident in both Germany and Britain but was most dramatically highlighted by 
the headscarf issue in France (Freedman 2004). The suppressed religious past of 
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these societies is now in the foreground and their supposedly robust secular char-
acter comes under question.  
Secularism is also contested in political theory, with Indian academics among 
the first to voice their opposition (Nandy 1998; Madan 1998; Chatterjee 1998). The 
argument here is that the external threat to secularism in India is symptom of a 
deeper internal crisis, and that the conceptual and normative structure of secularism 
is itself terribly flawed. Secularism is said to be linked to a flawed modernization, 
has a mistaken view of rationality and its importance in human life, makes an im-
practical demand that religion be excluded from public life, fails to appreciate the 
importance of communities in the life of religious people, and has a wholly exagger-
ated sense of the positive character of the modern state. The critics of secularism 
also include several western scholars. Up until the 1990s, western critics mostly 
wished to fine-tune secular states, making them a littler more sensitive to religion, 
and tended to focus narrowly on two issues: can citizens in liberal democracies justify 
political decisions by relying exclusively on religious reasons? And can they make 
such decisions by relying solely on religious rather than secular considerations? 
Critics argued either (a) that while the justifications may be public and secular, ac-
tual decision-making may be grounded solely on a religious rationale (Greenawalt 
1998) or (b) that not only political decisions but their justification too, could in 
certain contexts rely solely on a religious rationale (Perry 1991). 
Critiques of western secularism have since become more trenchant. Several 
western scholars claim that by enjoining believers to leave behind religious convic-
tions when they step into public life, secularism shows hostility to believers, inhibits 
diversity, and homogenizes the public domain. Others say it is suited to Protestant-
ism and religions that are weakly protestantized, but excludes or is inimical to other 
religions. Secularism is said to be a parochial doctrine with universalistic pretensions 
(Keane 2000: 14ff.; Connolly 1999: 23ff.; Asad 2003). It denies its own dependence 
on a visceral register it publicly denounces as irrational; it purports to fight religious 
hegemony but establishes itself as the authoritative basis of adjudication in public 
life (Connolly 1999: 38f.). Secularism is seen as failing to accommodate community-
specific rights and unable to protect religious minorities from discrimination and 
exclusion; its peace-talk is represented as mere sham because it is a conflict-genera-
ting ideology that threatens pluralist democracies.  
Critical writing on secularism is ambiguous between two claims: whether to seek 
alternatives to secularism, or alternative conceptions of secularism. I begin by asking 
what distinguishes secular states from their competitors and what precise alterna-
tives critics have in mind when they seek to replace them. I consider the merits and 
demerits of secular and non-secular states, exploring what ethical gains or losses 
might ensue in the movement from a secular state to one that grants more impor-
tance to religion. If secular states are more worthy, is this true of all forms of secular 
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states or only some? If only some, which? I elaborate the conceptual and normative 
structure of secularism so as to identify a version that meets the most important 
objections. Finally, I consider whether the search for alternative conceptions en-
ables us to cut through the division between a modern West and traditional East. I 
argue that the Indian version of secularism is a modern alternative to its Western 
counterpart, one from which everyone may benefit in the future. 
The Conceptual Structure of Secularism 
Theocracy and States with Established Religions 
To identify the conceptual structure of secularism, I begin by contrasting it with the 
anti-secular doctrines to which it is related and opposed. Anti-secular doctrines 
favour not separation but union or alliance between church/religion and state. A 
state that has a union with a particular religious order is a theocratic state, governed 
by divine laws directly administered by a priestly order claiming divine commission 
(The Catholic Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 14: 13). The Islamic republic of Iran as 
Khomeni aspired to run it is an obvious example. A theocratic state should be dis-
tinguished from one that establishes religion. Here, religion is granted official, legal 
recognition, but while both state and religion benefit from a formal alliance, the 
sacerdotal order does not govern the state. States with an established church are 
therefore in some ways disconnected from religion. In particular, there is a degree 
of institutional differentiation between the two, with distinct functions performed in 
each by different personnel. Yet there is a more significant sense in which the state 
and church are connected to one another, sharing a common end largely defined by 
religion. There may also be a connection at the level of policy and law, with these 
flowing from and being justified in terms of the union between state and church. 
The institutional disconnection – at the level of roles, functions and powers – there-
fore goes hand in hand with a first- and third-level connection of ends and policies. It 
is the second-order disconnection of church and state that differentiates a state with 
established church-based religion from a theocracy.  
Just as theocracy is not always properly distinguished from the establishment of 
religion, so a distinction is not always drawn between the establishment of religion 
and the establishment of the church of a religion. Not all religions have churches. 
Yet a state may grant formal recognition to a church-free religion. A majority of 
Hindu nationalists in India, for example, wish to establish Hinduism as the state 
religion, but has no church to establish. Early Protestants wanted to disestablish the 
Roman Catholic Church without wishing the state to derecognize Christianity as the 
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favoured religion. The establishment of a single religion is consistent with the dis-
establishment or non-establishment of a church, with the establishment of a single 
church, or the establishment of multiple churches. Establishment of multiple relig-
ions, with or without churches, is also possible. There are, therefore, five types of 
regimes with a close relationship between state and religion. First, a theocracy, 
where there is no institutional separation between church and state, and the sacer-
dotal order is also the direct political ruler. Second, states with the establishment of 
single religion, subdivided into three types: (a) without the establishment of a 
church, (b) with the establishment of a single church and (c) with the establishment 
of multiple churches. Third, there are states, which establish multiple religions.  
When anti-separationists imagine the replacement of a secular state with some 
other type, which of these do they have in mind? Some religious activists clearly 
desire a theocracy or a state that establishes their own religion or church. However, 
most anti-separationist academics neither endorse nor explicitly reject this, attacking 
separation but distancing themselves from a wholly religion-centered polity. This is 
not surprising for a cursory evaluation of such polities shows that all are deeply 
troublesome. In states that established a single church – the unreformed established 
Protestant Churches of England, Scotland and Germany, and the Catholic 
Churches in Italy and Spain – there was not only inequality among religions but also 
among churches of the same religion (Levy 1994: 5). When members of other 
church or religious groups gained strength, the multiple-denominational society was 
wracked by inter-religious or inter-denominational wars. When they did not, reli-
gious minorities faced persistent religious persecution (as was the case with Jews in 
several European countries till the 19th century).  
The persecution of minorities and internal dissenters continues as a problem 
wherever one religion is both formally and substantively established. It is important 
to stress this because recent critiques of secularism often recommend a more ac-
commodative stance towards religion while neglecting elementary facts about what 
this might entail. Consider Pakistan, where the virtual establishment of the Sunni 
sect has proved disastrous to minorities, including Muslim minorities. For example, 
under Article 260 of the constitution, Ahmedis have been deemed a non-Muslim 
minority and forbidden from using Islamic nomenclature in their religious and 
social lives (Malik 2002: 10; Bhargava 2004: 30). Ahmedis have been tried and con-
victed for calling themselves Muslims or using the word »mosque« to designate their 
place of worship. Or consider the pogrom in Gujarat, and how disastrous the es-
tablishment of a Hindu Rashtra in India would be for Muslim minorities. Consider 
Israel, where it would be hard to claim that religious minorities enjoy the same 
rights as Jews.  
States, which substantively establish multiple churches or religions – New York 
in the middle of the 17th century, and the Vijayanagar Kingdom in the 14th century – 
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are in some ways an improvement. They are likely to be relatively peaceful. Mem-
bers of different denominations are likely to tolerate one another. There may be 
general equality among churches or religions. Schools run by religious institutions 
may be financially aided on a non-discriminatory basis (Levy 1994: 12). The state may 
grant each denomination a considerable autonomy in its own affairs. But states with 
establishment of multiple churches have their limitations, for they may continue to 
persecute members of other religions and atheists, and are usually indifferent to the 
liberty of individuals within each religious group. Closed and oppressive commu-
nities can thrive in such contexts. These states may not have legal provisions allow-
ing individuals to exit their religious community. They may give recognition to 
particular religious identities but fail to recognize multiple or what may be called 
non-particularized identities. They are usually unconcerned with the non-religious 
liberties of individuals or groups; and often indifferent to citizenship rights.  
Secular States 
So are secular states better from an ethical point of view? From a moral point of 
view, at least some secular states are deeply troublesome. I distinguish here three 
levels of disconnection, corresponding with the already identified levels of connec-
tion. A state may be disconnected from religion at the level of ends (first-level), of 
institutions (second-level) and of law and public policy (third-level). A secular state 
is distinguished from both theocracies and states with established religions by a 
primary, first-level, disconnection. It has freely standing ends that are substantially, 
if not always completely, disconnected from the ends of religion. Like states with 
established religions, secular states are institutionally disconnected. But secular 
states go considerably further in their disconnection: they break away completely, 
refuse to establish religions, or formally disestablish these by withdrawing privileges 
established churches had earlier taken for granted. In a secular state, no official 
status is given to religion. No religious community can say the state belongs exclu-
sively to it. No one is compelled to pay tax for religious purposes or to receive 
religious instruction. No automatic grants to religious institutions are available. 
Theoretically, two things follow. First, a non-theocratic state is not automatically 
secular, because it is entirely consistent for a state neither to be inspired by divine 
laws nor run by a priestly order, but still have a formal alliance with one religion. 
Second, the institutional separation of state and religion cannot be the distinguish-
ing mark of secular states, because this is also a feature of states with established 
churches. Political secularism cannot be identified with church-state separation.  
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Varieties of Secular States 
A state may also be disconnected from religion at the level of law and public policy. 
In some cases, this disconnection is entirely opportunistic, serving the self-aggran-
dizing purposes of the state and its political class. I shall call these self-aggrandizing, 
amoral, secular states. Usually, they are imperial and autocratic A good example 
would be the British colonial state in India, which despite the frequent allegation of 
Christian bias, was a predominantly secular state motivated almost exclusively by 
power, wealth and social order, with a policy of tolerance and neutrality towards 
different religious communities. This is not so surprising, for empires are interested 
in the labour or tribute of their subjects, not their religion. Distinct from amoral 
secular states are value-based ones, states guided by values such as peace, liberty, 
and/or equality. Value-based secular states may defend the rights of individuals to 
criticize the religion into which they are born, and at the extreme, reject it, to freely 
embrace another religion, or remain without one. They make active citizenship 
rights, such as the right to vote or stand for public office, available without dis-
crimination, regardless of religion.  
This third-level disconnection may be made for different ends but also takes dif-
ferent forms. In some cases, disconnection means strict exclusion. Secularism here 
becomes a doctrine of political taboo and prohibits contacts with religious activities. 
This exclusion itself may take two forms. The first (one-sided) exclusion is typified 
by the early French and Turkish models. Here, religions are excluded in order to 
control, regulate and sometimes even destroy them. These states are anti-religious 
and may justify the disconnection on epistemological grounds, for example, that 
religion is obscurantist or superstitious. Or they may refer to a value such as equal-
ity, arguing, that important values can be realized only by controlling or eliminating 
religion. The second form, exemplified by the American or later French model, 
conceives of disconnection as mutual exclusion. Here, religious and political institu-
tions live as strangers to each other, at best with benign or respectful indifference. 
When a state is disconnected from religion at all three levels in this particular way, 
we may say that a »wall of separation« has been erected. On this conception of 
secularism, religion must be outside the purview of the state, and in this sense, 
privatized. These states (typically liberal-democratic) are not anti-religious, but give 
religion a particular form, protecting religious liberty, liberty more generally, and the 
equality of citizenship.  
Liberal-democratic secular states usually enjoin their citizens to support only 
those coercive laws for which there is public justification. Why so? Because if others 
are expected to follow a law in terms they do not understand and for reasons they 
cannot endorse, the principle of equal respect is violated (Audi 1993: 701; Larmore 
1996: 137; Solum 1990: 1095; Macedo 1990: 249; Rawls 1971: 337f.; Weithman 
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1997: 6). If other reasonable and conscientious citizens have good reason to reject a 
particular rationale in support of a coercive law then this rationale does not count as 
public justification. Because a religious rationale is a paradigmatic case of a reason 
that other citizens have good reasons to reject, it does not count as public justifica-
tion. Because of this, a law grounded solely on a religious rationale must never be 
enacted. In short, purely religious convictions or commitments have no role to play 
in democratic and pluralist polities. 
Critics who wish to rehabilitate religion in political life usually contrast states 
more hospitable to religions with self-aggrandizing amoral or mindlessly anti-reli-
gious secular states. This is an unfair comparison. This attempts to shift judgment in 
favour of religiously friendly states by pitting them against the worst forms of secu-
lar state. This comparison may serve a point: there is not always much to choose 
between theocracies or states with established states on the one hand, and amoral or 
absolutist secular states on the other. Both fare miserably on indices of freedom or 
equality. But when evaluating the relative merits of religious and secular states, it is 
the liberal-democratic model which must be kept in mind, not the routinely de-
bunked, severely anti-religious, or self-aggrandizing secular states. Little is to be 
gained from damning secularism, as Talal Asad does, by citing the atrocities of 
Hitler and Stalin or crimes committed by »secularists« such as Saddam Hussain or 
Ali Hyder (Asad 2003: 10). Nor is any point served by deriding secularists for failing 
to realize that Sharon does not need to invoke passages of the Torah to kill and 
terrorize the Palestinians. Secularism, a value-based doctrine, is as committed to 
denouncing these secular regimes as it is to berating religious states that violate 
principles of liberty and equality. Likewise, it is astonishing to read the claim that »in 
modern democratic politics, there is not much reason to fear a religious majority 
more than a secular majority« (van der Veer 2001: 20). Charles Taylor's arguments 
about the exclusionary tendencies in modern democratic states with religious or 
ethnic majorities point clearly towards the inherent possibilities in these states to-
wards de facto singular establishment, and the wide range of exclusions and injus-
tices that make them what they are (Taylor in Bhargava 1999: 138–163). To say, at 
this point, that religious majorities are no worse than secular majorities because 
different religious communities have coexisted in the past without violent conflict is 
both ambiguous and misses the point. It is ambiguous because it is hard to under-
stand what a secular majority means. If this means a group of hard-nosed secular 
absolutists who are deeply anti-religious, then the statement is true. But if it means a 
majority that wishes not to politicize religion in unprincipled ways, then this state-
ment is wrong. It misses the point because peace between communities is entirely 
compatible with all kinds of exclusions from the domain of freedom and equality. A 
fearful minority is willing to buy peace at any cost – something that Indians pain-
fully learnt again after the Bombay riots in 1992/93. 
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Critiques of Liberal-Democratic Secularism 
The question remains: what, if any, are the problems with this dominant western 
model? There are many criticisms. First, the requirement that religious reasons be 
excluded from liberal democratic politics is said to be offensive to religious persons 
who (like others) wish to support their favoured political commitments on the basis 
of their conscience (Sandel 1993: 483–496). If people believe that their politics must 
be consistent with their morality, why should they be discouraged or stigmatized for 
doing so? It is mistaken to assume that only religious people bring passion and 
sectarianism into politics or, as Richard Rorty believes, that only religion is a con-
versation stopper (Rorty 1994: 2; Eberle 2002: 77). By asking a religious person to 
exercise restraint and exclude religious reasons in justification for a coercive law, 
liberal secularism forces her to act against her conscience; in doing so it fails to 
respect her moral agency and violates its own principle of equal respect. Indeed, the 
demand that restraint be exercised may be counterproductive, because exclusion 
from the larger public sphere forces the religious to form their own narrow public 
where resentment and prejudice may flourish (Spinner-Halev 2000: 150–156). This 
can lead not only to the freezing of identities but to the building of unbreachable 
walls between the religious and other citizens. Therefore, »engagement with reli-
gious people is typically better than shunning them« (ibid.: 155).  
Second, this kind of secularism does not understand the believer’s life as it is 
lived from the inside. It misses out on perhaps the most significant feature of most 
religions: that they encourage their members to choose to live a disciplined, re-
stricted, rule-bound, and desire-abnegating life. A religious life is not just a life of 
whimsical attachment to a personal God, but one in which one submits to his 
commands and lives obediently by them. This may be a nightmare for a standard 
liberal but it captures the constitutive features of most religions rather better than 
liberal secularism. Third, interpreting separation as exclusion betrays its own sectari-
anism; this is a secularism that can live comfortably with liberal, protestantized, 
individualized and privatized religions, but has no resources to cope with those that 
mandate greater public or political presence, or have a strong communal orienta-
tion. This group-insensitivity makes it virtually impossible to accommodate com-
munity-specific rights and therefore to protect the rights of religious minorities. In 
short, while this secularism copes with inter-religious domination, it does not pos-
sess resources to deal with inter-religious domination.  
Fourth, western secularism is said to be a product of the Protestant ethic. 
Therefore, its universal pretensions are perhaps its greatest drawback. It presup-
poses a Christian civilization that is easily forgotten because over time it has silently 
slid into the background. Christianity allows this self-limitation, and much of the 
world innocently mistakes this rather cunning self-denial for disappearance (Con-
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nolly 1999: 24). If this description is correct, this »inherently dogmatic« secularism 
cannot coexist innocently with other religions (Keane 2000: 14; Madan 1998: 298). 
Given the enormous power of the state, it must try to shape and transform them – 
a clear instance of illegitimate influence, if not outright violence. Thus, with all its 
claims of leaving religions alone, of granting religions liberty, this secularism is seen 
as hostile to non-liberal, non-protestant believers (Hamburger 2002: 193–251). 
Overall, it seems to force upon us a choice between active hostility or of benign 
indifference. Fifth, liberal secularism relies excessively on a rationalist conception of 
reason that imposes unfair limits on the manner in which issues are to be brought in 
the public domain. Some issues are constitutively emotive; others become emotive 
because they are articulated by people who are not always trained to be rational in 
the way liberals mandate (Connolly 1999: 27). In short, secularism’s model of moral 
reasoning is context-insensitive, theoreticist, absolutist (non-comparative), enjoining 
us to think in terms of this or that, and too heavily reliant on monolithic ideas or 
values considered to be true or superior or wholly non-negotiable.  
These are powerful critiques, but it would be mistaken to see them as rebutting 
secularism altogether. In our imagination of social and public life, greater space 
must be given to non-liberal religions; such ways of life have moral integrity that 
liberal secularism frequently fails to realize. Yet, in our effort to accommodate such 
religions, we cannot deny that they continue to be a source of oppression and ex-
clusion. States that align with non-liberal religions frequently condone morally ob-
jectionable practices. In Pakistan, for example, the religiously sanctioned law of 
evidence, Qanoon-e-Shahadat, holds on a par the evidence of two women or two non-
Muslims with that of a single male Muslim, thereby establishing the intrinsic superi-
ority of Muslim men over women and minorities, and contravening the principle of 
equality (Malik 2002: 18). In Hinduism, religiously sanctioned customs related to 
purity and pollution, for example, the barring of menstruating women from enter-
ing several temples in India, continues to exclude women from the affairs of their 
own religion and perpetuate an institutionalized system of subordination. This vio-
lation of the religious rights of women severely compromises the secular character 
of the Indian state. 
What does all this show? It demonstrates three things. First, we must be sensi-
tive both to the moral integrity of liberal and non-liberal religious ways of living, and 
to religion-based oppression and exclusions. Second, states that are strongly aligned 
to religions may be sensitive to the moral integrity of non-liberal religions but not 
always to their oppressions. Third, that the policy of non-interference (mutual ex-
clusion) that is typical of liberal secularism can be self-defeating. In short, a concep-
tion of secularism is required that goes beyond but does not ignore liberal values, 
and does justice to both dimensions referred to above. I suggest that such a model 
has already been developed in the Indian sub-continent: a model that is neither 
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wholly Christian nor western; that meets the secularist objection to non-secular 
states and the religious objections to some forms of secularism. 
Indian Secularism  
Seven features of Indian secularism make it distinctive. The first is its multi-value 
character. Indian secularism more explicitly registers ties with values forgotten by 
western conceptions – for example, peace between communities – and interprets 
liberty and equality both individualistically and non-individualistically. It has a place 
for the rights of individuals to profess their religious beliefs but also the right of 
religious communities to establish and maintain educational institutions crucial for 
the survival and sustenance of their religious traditions. Second, because it was born 
in a deeply multi-religious society, it is concerned just as much with inter-religious 
as intra-religious domination. Although community-specific political rights (special 
representation rights for religious minorities such as Muslims) were withheld for 
contextual reasons, the model allows conceptual space for this. Third, it is commit-
ted to the idea of principled distance: poles apart from one-sided exclusion, mutual 
exclusion, strict neutrality or equidistance. Fourth, it admits a distinction between 
depublicization and depoliticization as well between different kinds of depoliticiza-
tion. Because it is not hostile to the public presence of religion, it aims to depubli-
cize it. It accepts the importance of one form of depoliticization of religion, namely 
the first- and second-level disconnection of state from religion but the third-level 
depoliticization of religion is accepted on purely contextual grounds. Fifth, it is 
combines active hostility to some aspects of religion (a ban on unsociability and a 
commitment to make religiously grounded personal laws more gender-just) with 
active respect for its other dimensions (religious groups are officially recognized, 
state-aid is available non-preferentially to educational institutions run by religious 
communities, there is no blanket exclusion of religion as mandated by western 
liberalism). This is a direct consequence of its commitment to multiple values and 
principled distance. The Indian model accepts the view that critique is consistent 
with respect, i.e. one does have to choose between hostility and respectful indiffer-
ence. In this sense, it inherits the tradition of the great Indian religious reformers 
who tried to change their religions precisely because they meant so much to them. 
Sixth, it is committed to a model of moral reasoning that is highly contextual and 
opens up the possibility of different societies working out their own secularisms. In 
short, it opens out the possibility of multiple secularisms. Seventh, it breaks out of 
the rigid interpretative grid that divides our social world into the western modern 
and traditional, indigenous non-western. Indian secularism is modern but departs 
significantly from mainstream conceptions of western secularism.  
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Principled Distance 
Let me further elucidate two features: contextual character and principled distance. 
As seen above, mainstream western secularism conceives separation mainly as mu-
tual exclusion. The idea of principled distance unpacks the metaphor of separation 
differently. It accepts a disconnection between state and religion at the level of ends 
and institutions but does not make a fetish of it at the third level of policy and law. 
Recall that political secularism is an ethic whose concerns relating to religion are 
similar to theories that oppose unjust restrictions on freedom, morally indefensible 
inequalities, inter-communal domination and exploitation. Yet a secularism based 
on principled distance is not committed to the mainstream Enlightenment idea of 
religion. It accepts that humans have an interest in relating to something beyond 
themselves, including God, and that this manifests itself as individual belief and 
feeling as well as social practice in the public domain. It also accepts that religion is 
a cumulative tradition (Smith 1991: 154–169) as well as a source of people's identi-
ties. But it insists that even if turned out that God exists and that one religion is true 
and others false, then this does not give the »true« doctrine or religion the right to 
force it on others who do not believe it. Nor does it give a ground for discrimina-
tion in the equal distribution of liberties and other valuable resources.  
Similarly, a secularism based on principled distance accepts that religion may not 
have special public significance antecedently written into and defining the character 
of the state or nation; but it does not follow from this that it has no public signifi-
cance at all. On some versions, the »wall of separation« thesis assumes precisely this. 
But as long as religion is publicly significant, a democratic state simply has to take it 
into account. Indeed, institutions of religion may influence individuals as long as 
they do so through the same process, by access to the same resources as anyone, 
and without undue advantage or unduly exploiting the fears and vulnerabilities that 
frequently accompany people in their experience of the religious.  
But what precisely is principled distance? The policy of principled distance en-
tails a flexible approach on the inclusion/exclusion of religion and engagement/dis-
engagement of the state, which at the level of law and policy should depend on the 
context, nature or current state of relevant religions. This engagement must be 
governed by principles undergirding a secular state, i.e. principles that flow from a 
commitment to the values mentioned above. Religion may intervene in the affairs 
of the state if such intervention promotes freedom, equality or any other value 
integral to secularism. For example, citizens may support a coercive law of the state 
grounded purely in a religious rationale if this law is compatible with freedom or 
equality. The state may engage with religion or disengage from it, may engage posi-
tively or negatively, but which it does will depend on whether these values are pro-
moted or undermined. Principled distance differs from strict neutrality, which in-
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sists that the state must help or hinder all religions to an equal degree and in the 
same manner. Rather, it rests upon Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between equal 
treatment and treating everyone as an equal (Dworkin 1978: 125). The principle of 
equal treatment, in the relevant political sense, requires that the state treat all its 
citizens equally in the relevant respect, for example in the distribution of a resource 
or opportunity. The principle of treating people as equals also entails that every 
person or group is treated with equal concern and respect. This second principle 
may sometimes require equal treatment, say an equal distribution of resources, but 
may also occasionally dictate unequal treatment. On this view, treating people or 
groups as equals is entirely consistent with differential treatment.  
Religious groups have often sought exemptions from practices in which states 
intervene by promulgating a law to be applied neutrally to the rest of society, argu-
ing either that the law requires them to do things not permitted by their religion or 
that it prevents them from doing acts mandated by it. For example, Sikhs demand 
exemptions from mandatory helmet laws and police dress codes to accommodate 
religiously required turbans. Elsewhere, Jews seek exemptions from Air force regu-
lations to accommodate their yarmulkes. Muslim women and girls demand that the 
state not interfere in their religiously required chador. Principled distance allows that 
a practice that is banned or regulated in one culture may be permitted in the minor-
ity culture because of the distinctive status and meaning it has for its members. 
Religious groups may demand that the state refrain from interfering in their prac-
tices, but may equally demand that the state interfere in such a way as to give them 
special assistance, the argument being that this will enable them to secure what 
other groups are able to routinely get by virtue of their social dominance. Principled 
distance may grant authority to religious officials to perform legally binding mar-
riages, to allow religions their own rules or methods for granting divorce and rela-
tions between ex-husband and ex-wife, their ways of defining a will or laws about 
post-mortem allocation of property, arbitration of civil disputes, and even methods 
of establishing property rights. 
However, principled distance does not merely allow special exemptions. Con-
sidering the historical and social condition of all relevant religions, it may require 
state intervention in some religions more than in others. For example, if the aim of 
the state is to advance social equality, this may require that the state interfere in 
caste-ridden Hinduism more than, say, Islam or Christianity. However, if a diver-
sity-driven religious liberty is the value to be advanced by the state, then it may have 
to intervene in Christianity and Islam more than in Hinduism. If this is so, the state 
can neither strictly exclude considerations emanating from religion nor keep strict 
neutrality with respect to religion. It cannot antecedently decide that it will always 
refrain from interfering in religions or that it will interfere in each equally. Indeed, it 
may not relate to every religion in society in exactly the same way or intervene in 
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each religion to the same degree or in the same manner. What it must ensure is that 
the relationship between the state and religions is guided by non-sectarian motives 
consistent with values and principles.  
Contextual Secularism 
I describe a context-sensitive secularism based on the idea of principled distance as 
contextual secularism. »Contextual« in this sense captures the idea that the form and 
content of secularism will vary from one context to another; and that the process of 
moral reasoning should itself be contextual (Taylor 1994: 16–43; see also the argu-
ment in Parekh 2000; Carens 2000). This reflects its character as a multi-value doc-
trine. To accept that secularism is a multi-value doctrine is to acknowledge that its 
constitutive values may come into conflict with one another. Some degree of inter-
nal discord and a fair amount of instability is therefore an integral part of contextual 
secularism. For this reason, it always requires fresh interpretations, contextual 
judgments and attempts at reconciliation and compromise. No general a priori rule 
of resolving these conflicts exists; neither does any easy lexical order, pre-existing 
hierarchy among values or laws that enables us to decide that, no matter what the 
context, a particular value must override everything else. For example, the conflict 
between individual rights and group rights cannot always be adjudicated by recourse 
to some general and abstract principle. Rather it can only be settled case by case and 
may require a fine balancing of competing claims. The eventual outcome may not 
be wholly satisfactory to either side but still be reasonably satisfactory to both. 
Multi-value doctrines such as secularism encourage accommodation – not the 
giving up of one value for the sake of another but rather their reconciliation and 
possible harmonization i.e. to make each work without changing the basic content 
of apparently incompatible concepts and values.  
This endeavor to make concepts, viewpoints and values work simultaneously 
does not amount to a morally objectionable compromise. Nothing of importance is 
given up for the sake of a less significant thing. Rather, what is pursued is a mutually 
agreed middle way that combines elements from two or more valuable entities. The 
roots of the attempts at reconciliation and accommodation lie in a lack of dogma-
tism, a willingness to experiment, to think at different levels and in separate spheres 
and a readiness to take decisions on a provisional basis. This captures a way of 
thinking characterized by the following dictum: »why look at things in terms of this 
or that, why not try to have both this and that.« (Austin 1996: 318) In this way of 
thinking, it is recognized that though we may be currently unable to secure the best 
of both values and therefore forced to settle for a watered-down version of each, 
we continue to have an abiding commitment to search for a transcendence of this 
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second best condition. Two things follow. First, the practice of secularism requires 
a different model of moral reasoning than one that straightjackets moral under-
standing in the form of well delineated, explicitly stated rules. Second, secularism is 
an ethically sensitive negotiated settlement between diverse groups and divergent 
values.  
Is Secularism a Christian and Western Doctrine? 
What then of the claim that secularism is a Christian, western, doctrine and unable 
to adapt itself easily to cultural conditions elsewhere? The link between secularism 
and Christianity is exaggerated, if not entirely mistaken. It is true that the institu-
tional separation of church and state is an internal feature of Christianity and an 
integral part of western secularisms. But we have seen that this church-state discon-
nection is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of secular-
ism even in societies with church-based religions. It is clearly not a necessary condi-
tion for the development of all forms of secularisms. The mutual exclusion of re-
ligion and the state is not the defining feature of secularism. The idea of separation 
can be interpreted differently. Nor are religious integrity, peace and toleration (in-
terpreted broadly to mean »live and let live«), uniquely Christian values, for most 
non-Christian civilizations have given significant space to each. Though we find 
some of the most systematic articulation of this doctrine in Christian writings, even 
the western conception of secularism is not exclusively Christian. 
Secularism is not just a Christian doctrine, but is it western? Up to a point, 
secularism is certainly a western idea. More specifically, as a clearly articulated doc-
trine, it has distinct western origins. Although elements that constitute secularism 
assume different cultural forms and are found in several civilizations, the idea of the 
secular was first properly theorized in the west. One might then say that the early 
and middle history of secularism is almost entirely dominated by western societies. 
However, the same cannot be said of its later history. Nationalism and democracy 
arrived in much of the west after the settlement of religious conflicts, in societies 
that had been more or less religiously homogenized (with the exception of the Jews, 
who continued to face persistent persecution). The absence of deep religious diver-
sity and conflict meant that issues of citizenship could be addressed almost entirely 
disregarding religious context; the important issue of community specific rights to 
religious groups could be wholly ignored. This had a decisive bearing on the west-
ern conception of secularism. However, for non-western societies such as India, the 
case is different. Both national and democratic agendas had to face issues raised by 
deep religious difference and diversity. In India, nationalism had to choose between 
the religious and the secular. Similarly, the distribution of active citizenship rights 
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could not be conceived or accomplished by ignoring religion. It was necessary to 
actively disregard religion (as in political rights) or develop a more complex attitude 
to it, as in the case of cultural rights, where the state had to balance claims of indi-
vidual autonomy with those of community obligations, and the necessity of keeping 
religion »private« with its inescapable, often valuable, presence in the public. In 
doing so, Indian secularism never completely annulled particular religious identities.  
The later history of secularism is more non-western than western. Mainstream 
theories or ideologies in modern, western, societies take little notice of features 
constitutive of the Indian model, and struggle to deal with the post-colonial reli-
gious diversity of their societies. To discover its own rich and complex structure, 
western secularism can look backward to its own past, or sideways to an Indian 
secularism that mirrors not only the past of secularism, but in a way, also its future. 
A good hard look at Indian secularism could change the self-understanding of west-
ern secularisms.  
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